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Inadequate performance of the labour institution and its derivates 
(trade unions, technical safety services) is to a great extent accountable for 
the accumulation of social unrest and psychological tension. The growing 
number of accidents and disasters, non-motivated acts of violence and mur-
ders, large-scale adulteration of foodstuffs and drugs, and, what is most im-
portant, the endless chain of fraud and extortion cases in financial and other 
spheres – all this taken together means that no safe places have been left in 
the everyday life space; there remain only more or less dangerous places. 
Finally, two sociopsychological factors of dissatisfaction should be 
mentioned. The former is that the gestalt of the ‘favourite leader’ shattered 
and even those who loved it got bored with it (Radzichovsky, 2012). Taking 
into consideration the age-old Russian tradition to sacralise supreme author-
ity, its delegitimisation is a very serious destabilizing factor. The latter is 
mistrust again. The government simply stopped paying attention to it. ‘…So 
many stillborn empty slogan-like campaigns have been engineered be the 
rulers over the past decade: “modernisation”, “commercialisation”, “trans-
formation”, “intellectualisation”, “nano-technolisation”’ (Gurevich, 2011: 
16). But How will all this improve people’s sociopsychological well-being 
had not been addressed at all. 
 
 
4. Accumulation of a critical mass of protest 
 
An illusion persisted in Russia that if something had not been shown 
on central TV, it not happened at all. Two events put a stop to wishful think-
ing: forest and peat fires in Central Russia which TV could not keep silent 
about, and arrangement of aid to victims via the Internet, which boosted the 
potency of networking and, what is even more important, imparted a new 
quality to it (Yanitsky, 2011a). The internet has made public the govern-
ment’s incapacity and reluctance to perform its functions. 
And so the protest movement started to expand steadily beginning in 
2010. At first, there emerged small seats of protest, then protestors began to 
unite into regional and local coalitions and, finally, series of mass protest 
meetings combusted in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large cities [3]. 
The general trend: transformation of social, environmental and others civic 
protests into political ones [4]. Another feature: their network affiliation, to 
which the traditional Russian power vertical had been absolutely unprepared. 
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Surprisingly, the ruling party United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya) practically 
disappeared from the arena of public politics all of a sudden. The feeling of a 
mass of people exclusion was multiply enhanced by the public statement 
concerning exchange of chairs that had been made in advance by the ‘ruling 
tandem’: V.Putin will be president and D.Medvedev will be prime minister 
(what is really happened in May 2012). The people called this deal ‘tiny cas-
tling’. 
An All-Russian Popular Front was urgently set up in parallel with, or 
rather in substitution of, the ruling top that had been moved aside by the rul-
ers themselves. Putin, the acknowledged political leader of the country and 
its new president, headed it and delegated guidance of the ruling party to the 
ex-president D. Medvedev. And the longer the government was irresponsive 
to protestors’ demands, the more explicit and persistent the latter’s political 
demands became. The people came to understand that the state machine had 
fully alienated itself from civil society and lived by its own laws. 
Then, the idea of modernization in Russia had ‘suddenly’ faded 
away somehow and vanished from the front pages of newspapers and TV 
news programmes. The key figures of the Institute of Modern Development 
that had been specially set up to translate this idea into concrete programmes 
and projects of modernization likewise left the public arena. And judging 
from Putin’s pre-election promises what might be expected is just a conser-
vative project of Russia’s modernization (Yanitsky, 2011b). Eventually, 
elections to the VI State Duma (the parliament) held in December 2010, 
which civic organizations appraised as being falsified, topped off formation 
of the critical mass of protest [5; 6]. 
 
5. Models of the mass protest movement 
My further considerations are based on recent work of the US soci-
ologist K. Ash (2011) who analyzed models of protest movements in post-
communist countries. Ash states that in these countries civil society took on 
the role of a challenger to the power of the state and of an imperative for the 
functioning of a democracy. By creating non-state associations civic organi-
zations created the capability to confront and repel the forces of an intrusive 
state. Organizations evolved and built networks with one another, which 
then retained the capability of mobilizing and challenging the policies of a 
